aims to probe not only the importance, but also the specificity of the role that knowledge plays within the general framework of the Zedekunst, I consider it useful to start by examining which intellectual authorities Coornhert uses to construe and to defend his program of moral self-individuation, as well as how he himself legitimizes them. In order to do that, I will also refer to other texts written by Coornhert, such as the first part of the Synode over de gewetensvrijheid 7 (1582) and the first part of his Proces van't ketter-dooden 8 (1590), in which he inserted some of his correspondence with Lipsius. The explicitly polemical outset of these texts encouraged Coornhert to express his opinion on the use of authorities in general, that is to say, authorities biblical, patristic and classical. This is in a very conspicuous way far less the case in the Zedekunst, for in spite of this ethic's occasionally controversial character, Coornhert wrote to put a hold on rather than to start a dispute of any kind. The second part of my contribution will further deepen the relation between Coornhert's handling of auctoritas and the aim of his ethical project by examining his theory on knowledge as it appears from the Zedekunst's fifth chapter of the second book, entitled « Vande kennisse ende wetenschap », as well as from the dedication or "Toe-eyghen brief" to this work.
Before continuing, I want to make clear from the outset that the purpose of my contribution does not lie in locating each and every author Coornhert uses, whether implicitly or not. It would require a whole separate project to do so. Although we have at our disposal the dissertation by van der Meer on the classical elements in the Zedekunst, 9 a lot of gaps still need to be filled. For example, an overview study, including not only all the classical but also the medieval and contemporary sources for the Zedekunst, does not exist. Yet, given the specific text-strategies used by Coornhert, it seems to me that this task of filing his sources might never be concluded. 7 Its original title is Synodus. Van der conscientien vryheydt. 8 Both works are available in the digital library of the Coornhert foundation. 9 SUFFRIDUS VAN Great and Darius -the latter mainly in his chapter on friendship. Some philosopher's sayings are also explicitly quoted -Socrates' famous "all I know is that I know nothing" 13 and his self-defence against Melite, or the philosopher Xenocrates in defending his friend Plato against the tyrant Dionysius -but like the former, these examples always take the form of historical facts or legends, never of textual citations introduced by the thinker's name. 10 See VAN Coornhert's particular way of using his sources pertains to the three compatible causes explained below.
To assume that Coornhert only unconsciously re-used in the Zedekunst several thoughts and expressions he had encountered throughout his personal readings would oversimplify matters.
Firstly, mentioning the name of his auctoritates would contradict the very essence of the ethical ideal he wants to propagate. Of course, Coornhert does essentially write for a not classically educated public he can't risk to frighten off with name-juggling of any sort (cf.
infra). He knows that his message of moral conversion will pass far more easily if he doesn't try to dazzle his readers with names of authors and notes on philosophical schools they scarcely heard of. But far more importantly, we need to understand that the very foundation of Coornhert's ideal of the virtuous life lies in the reader's ability to internalize the ethical norms the Zedekunst sets out. Since the purpose of Coornhert's ethic is to form self-regulating individuals, emphasizing the fact that the moral standards are mainly drawn from outside 14 See also VAN In my view, Becker's theory is not completely satisfactory, since Coornhert still explicitly refutes the idea of predestination in the Zedekunst, whereby -albeit without mentioning their names -he obviously lashes out against Calvin, Beza and the preachers from Delft. In this sense, the Zedekunst unmistakably shows a controversial character, even though it doesn't form its primary goal: Coornhert didn't want to publish a "kyf-boeck", as he writes himself 25 . But he also wasn't one to avoid conflict altogether if he thought he was right. I therefore agree with Gerlof Verwey that the explanation for the absence of the biblical text in the Coornhert aimed to offer ethical guidance that exceeded the religious differences of his time (cf. infra), he surely would have wanted to avoid this kind of negative attention because it could hamper the transfer of knowledge necessary to his project of moral conversion.
Where pagan meets Christian: the importance of natural law
Apart from the Bible, it is clear that Coornhert also often resorts to ancient thinkers, and he does so especially in the first book of the Zedekunst, that is centred around the human emotions, a topic many pagan philosophers wrote about. Two compatible explanations come to mind. First, the simple fact that the theorisation on human emotions forms a long tradition which started in early Antiquity. This makes it quite logical for a writer, especially a
Renaissance writer like Coornhert to draw upon these sources. Secondly and most importantly, in the Zedekunst Coornhert implicitly legitimizes his classical authorities on grounds of their compatibility with the Christian thinkers. The link between them lies in the principle of "natural law", the inner virtue each and every man is bestowed with upon birth.
This principle is central to the perfectibilist project of the Zedekunst, as it will also appear from the following analysis of the second book's fifth chapter (ZK II, V. 11).
As Becker states, Coornhert gives several meanings to the principle of "natural law".
Sometimes he conceives of it as a modern law of physics, saying that "death is a manifestation of natural law", or he uses it to refer to our natural instincts. However, in most cases Coornhert understands the principle of natural law as a moral codex written in each and every one of us since the dawn of man. This moral codex takes part in the divine grace for it is a gift we receive from God, just as the servants in the biblical "parable of the talents" (Matthew 25: 14-30). This gift forms the seed out of which our virtue can spring and grow.
The Zedekunst is written to help its readers rediscover that gift, and again this is why
Coornhert must avoid the personal anecdote.
In the first book, Coornhert describes the natural law as "ghezond verstand" 29 or "common sense" , but mostly he refers to it as the philosophical-religious principle of the golden rule or ethic of reciprocity : limitations. Consequently, they lack that necessary knowledge of the self 46 which they could easily acquire through self-contemplation. They give in to perpetual speculation or "vernuftelizeren » which prevents them from morally improving themselves and only brings them bitterness and distress (Toe-eyghen brief, 2). Hence Coornhert's motto "Weet of rust" 1 :
even knowledge calls for moderation or it becomes "Adamsche weetghiericheyd » (Toeeyghen brief, 2).
It is not without coincidence that both of the above expressions have a double meaning. In a theoretical sense, the expression « weet of rust » renders Coornhert's position against curiosity or « weetghiericheyd » for it being an ill-directed « leerghiericheyd » 47 destined to gain knowledge that is only within God's reach 48 . In a practical sense, the expression refers to the danger of not acting according to secure knowledge or « weten ». Only reasonable doubt 49 , says Coornhert, leads us to the « weten » that brings us peace of mind, whereas thoughtless actions breed misconception which in turn leads to unhappiness. In Coornhert's view, Adam just as any man must have only aspired to do good. Unfortunately, he allowed 44 See ZK II, IV. 5: "Hier komtmen in twyfele, zonder datmen van zodanighen zake dan noch een oordeel heeft. Dit heetmen eyghentlyck onpartydigh of zonder voor oordeel te wezen. Hoewel men oock niet heel zonder reden oock onpartydigh noemt luyden die nu van een zake al een oordeel hebben, maar dat zo los, dat zy bereyt zyn zulck huer oordeel te gheven om een beter. » On the second page of the "Toe-Eyghen brief", Coornhert narrows this definition down to the group of scholars who only read the writings of their teachers and forget Scripture : « De partydighe lezen zelden de godlyke, maar doorghaans de menschelyke schriften, te weten: elck die ghemaackt zyn byde leraren daar an hy is hanghende. Furthermore, the reference to Adam's curiositas fulfills yet another meaning in the light of Coornhert's project : it also accords with Coornhert's belief that the only kind of certain knowledge for man comes from within himself, and that the turn of the self instigated by this knowledge can only be acquired through a thorough work of that self on itself.
Having chosen to principally write for the not classically educated burgher, Coornhert does not elaborate on every form of knowledge 50 . In fact, the taxonomy of the different kinds of knowledge isn't what interests him in the first place: for his ethical project, only the difference between "kennisse" and "wetenschap" is relevant to him. Yet, Coornhert does complicate matters, at least for the modern reader: he defines "wetenschap" by using the exact term he wants to contrast it with, namely "kennisse". Given this overlap between Coornhert's definitions of "kenisse" and "wetenschap", a general understanding of the Zedekunst's project is needed to distinguish both of the terms correctly.
Regarding the notion "wetenschap", Coornhert gives two definitions, the first one being as follows: Coornhert's description of the term looks quite ambivalent, since it seems to mix up epistemological ("beginselen" or axioms) and moral categories ("verzochtheyd" or experience and "wet der naturen" or natural law). This is due to one of his central beliefs by which the unity of an important (moral) concept -be it truth or virtue -is proven by the circular relation between its components:
» Het en magh gheen een zelve ding zyn dat verschillende is in zyn oorsprong, of in zyn ghedaante, of int ghene het in bestaat, of eynde, of wercking, of vrucht. Alle deze onghelyckheyden zyn ontwyfelyck tusschen het gheloven ende weten.« (ZK II, V. 20)
Therefore, "wetenschap" both originates in and consists of valid theorems or "voortstellen"
and "beginselen der betrachtinghen". Virtue, in turn, simultaneously forms the goal, the 50 As is implied throughout the entire text of the Zedekunst, the circularity of this concept lies in the fact that its very rediscovering consists in our acting according to it.
A second reason why Coornhert's definition of the term "wetenschap" is problematic, lies in the fact that he uses its antonym "kennis" to define it -even though claiming that both of the notions are radically different. In the fifth chapter of the second book, Coornhert says that the difference between "kennisse" and "wetenschap" corresponds with that between, respectively, "faith" and "truth" The definition of knowledge as faith suggests that "wetenschap" and "kennisse" are simply antonyms, whereas they are not: aside from this comparison with faith, Coornhert principally treats the concept of "kennisse" as an overarching notion for every form of "knowing", be it true or false. In this sense, it can also incorporate wetenschap as its " vierde toestemming", the one that is always reliable. I would therefore suggest that « wetenschap » can at best be translated as « truth ». The concept of « kennisse » can be rendered by the general notion of "knowledge". Coornhert's second definition of "wetenschap" supports this choice:
» zo houde ick de kennisse of wetenschappe, daar af ick nu handele, te zyn een warachtigh verstand der dinghen, te weten een ontwyfelyck begrip des ghemoeds door zekere redene ende oorzaken vanden dinghen diemen weet. Of wetenschap is (na 'tzegghen van andere) een zeker verstand, vastelyck besloten (geconcludeerd uit) uyt warachtighe voortstellen [premissen] .« (ZK II, V. 14)
That said, Coornhert explains his inconsistency in distinguishing "kennisse" from Even more important than the two definitions above, Coornhert also presents "wetenschap" as an umbrella term for two specific kinds of knowledge that stand in a circular relation to each other and are therefore never to be separated in view of the virtuous life:
» Wel is waar datmen vint voornemelyck tweereleye wetenschappen, elck tot een zonderling [afzonderlijk] eynde streckende, zo dat de betrachtelycke kennisse opte waarheyd, ende die hantteerlycke opte werckinghe der dueghden 't oghe heeft. Maar des niet te min en werdt noch die betrachtelycke van niemanden verkreghen zonder dat innerlycke werck vant betrachten, van anmercken, van nadencken, redenpleghinghe ende overweghinghe van 't een teghen 't ander.« (ZK II, V. 52)
Coornhert designates these two kinds of knowledge as "betrachtelycke" and "hantteerlycke", respectively theoretical and practical knowledge. Both kinds of knowledge are contemplative of nature 53 , forming the two main currents of traditional philosophy symbolized by the letters pi en theta embroidered on the dress of Boethius' Lady Philosophy. And yet again, the term "kennisse" is used to define "wetenschap".
In short, it appears from chapter V that Coornhert's "wetenschap" pertains to truthful knowledge. The specific nature of this kind of knowledge only becomes clear in light of the general purpose of the Zedekunst: moral improvement of its readers. From this point of view it is easy to understand that Coornhert's "wetenschap" stands for moral Truth of which the ultimate embodiment is God. Therefore, his "wetenschap" cannot be translated as "science", since it is subjective and doesn't refer to an objective scientific truth that can be verified by sensorial experience 54 . The subjectivity of this kind of knowledge doesn't contradict its veracity: "wetenschap" has, can, and should be continuously verified through life-experience that will prove its reliability.
The most important difference between "kennisse" and "wetenschap" lies in this very possibility of verification by life experience. In his first definition of "wetenschap", Coornhert calls the result of this verification "verzochtheyd" (ZK II, V. 11). It goes without saying that self-contemplation plays a very important part in this process, as will be discussed below. It comes down to this: in order to assert whether knowledge is truthful, it has to be verified by the everyday experience of every man. The truthfulness of knowledge only ever dawns upon us after being put into question over and over again:
» Maar alsmen ziet int licht met andacht, de dinghen recht verstaat ende men die allengskens oeffent metter daad, dan verlaatmen de loghen, dan volghtmen de waarheyd ende dan werdtmen dueghdlyck. Dan ismen ghescheyden uyten duysteren nacht van onwetenheyd, gheghaan door de schemerighe twyfel des wanens ende ghekomen inden dagh des klaren wetenschaps.« (ZK II, V. 48)
Whereas "wetenschap" or truth will never deceive the one who follows it and bring serenity and peace of mind, false knowledge -the true nature of which is often clouded by human desire 55 -will prove itself to bring nothing but unhappiness, if not immediately, certainly after a certain period of time 56 .
For Coornhert, this difference between "kennisse" and "wetenschap" is essential, since only truthful knowledge or "weten" as he puts it can make it possible for man to act truly virtuously, in accordance with God's laws. In Coornhert's paradigm, this "weten" is synonymous to both ware kennis" and "wetenschap" and is also closely related to the first Here Coornhert clearly states that only secure knowledge regarding the good management of our emotions, desires and fears, is really necessary. This applies simultaneously to each of the three levels of human action mentioned above: "hier toe en komtmen niet dan by trappen » (ZK III, V. 25). The reason why Coornhert pays this much attention to the topic of human emotions, lies in the fact that he perceives of badly handled or controlled passions as the second most important obstacle to the ideal of virtuous life he wants to carry out; the first one being "plain ignorance" or the earlier mentioned "onverstandighe blindheyd".
"Betrachtelycke" vs. "hantteerlycke" kennis.
As suggested above, Coornhert's thought on human emotions is central to the perfectibilist project of the Zedekunst. The importance of this topic is firstly proven by the fact that it covers the whole of the Zedekunst's first book (as Coornhert also points out in his introduction to book II). Its actual centrality however most evidently -and not without significance -appears from the fifth chapter of the second book, the title of which as I said can be rendered as "Of knowledge and Truth". As I have shown, Coornhert considers the virtuous life to be by any means inaccessible if one doesn't learn to manage one's emotions.
Hence, knowledge and virtue are closely entangled in the project of the Zedekunst 57 , as appeared from the previous analysis of Coornhert's definitions of "kennisse" and "wetenschap". These definitions are deeply embedded in his ethical project since they do not refer to pure epistemological, but rather moral concepts.
Throughout the Zedekunst, the process of learning to control one's emotions forms the best example of the two-step conversion that constitutes the very essence of the ideal of "welleven" Coornhert wants to propagate. Each step of this conversion requires a different kind of knowledge. Firstly, it requires the purely theoretical knowledge of emotionmanagement and the good life. Coornhert refers to this knowledge as "betrachtelycke kennisse" (ZK II, V. 52) and he believes it to lead to « redelycke dueghde » or rational virtue 58 .
As Coornhert further states, every art's apprentice needs a competent tutor to learn him the basics from which he can develop himself 59 , discover his inner virtue and eventually educate others 60 . As shown above, this "inner virtue" or "natural law" is very important: it not only forms the basis of every man's possibility to become virtuous, but also of Coornherts legitimization of his intellectual authorities. In the case of the Zedekunst, the tutor takes the form of a spiritual advisor. Coornhert takes up this role. As an "onder meester" or "ghetuyghe » (ZK I, I. As a result of the perfect virtuous life being de facto unattainable for man 64 , it can finally only consists in an act of constant self-conversion based on the self-knowledge one first gains through self-contemplation both instigated and guided by the tutor's lessons, and that one subsequently has to deepen through autonomous self-contemplation. This is the case for both Coornhert and his readers. It is this striving for perfection that Coornhert calls "welleven", not the realisation of the ideal in itself, which obviously explains -aside from the ancient tradition of the ars vitae, of course -why Coornhert speaks of the virtuous life in terms of an "art" 65 .
Coornhert not only uses this metaphor in the title of his ethic, he also returns to it on several occasions throughout the Zedekunst. For not only does his reader need a tutor to teach him the essential rules of the art of virtue, he also needs to put them into practice to understand them better and to become a better man. In other words, Coornhert holds that true virtue cannot exist without the "betrachtelycke kennisse" -in itself the result of the "hantteerlycke kennisse" he received from others, i.e. the Bible or those pagan authors in accordance with ithe delivers being put into practice to become the "hantteerlycke kennisse" of his readers, without rational virtue leading to moral virtue or "zedelycke deughde", the ultimate goal of his ethic 66 . As for the difference between "betrachtelycke" and "hantteerlycke" knowledge on the one hand, and rational and moral virtue on the other, it lies in the fact that the first two are mere theoretical concepts of which the last two notions already define the practical result:
virtue. By definition, virtue cannot be other than practice. True knowledge without practice is "onvruchtbare verbeelding", dead knowledge 68 . So, just like in ancient philosophy, Coornhert subordinates theory to practice 69 .
After this first, externally appealed conversion through theoretical knowledge, follows a conversion based on practice motivated from the inside. After being reborn, the life artapprentice needs to deepen and complete the received knowledge through constant selfcontemplation of which only he is responsible. This theoretical knowledge, of course, comes from another individual's self-contemplation: Coornhert. In this sense, the Zedekunst itself is also an act of self-conversion. One look at the first lines of the 'Toe-eyghen brief' suffices to understand this:
alzo spieghelt datze hem dient tot ware kennisse van zynen state, dats van zich zelve, die heeft naast Gode ende zyn andachtigh opmercken in dezen spieghele, die ick u mits dezen toe eyghene, u daar af te bedancken.« (Toe-eyghen brief, 1)
With the Zedekunst, Coornhert claims to offer a personal work to his readers, a work he calls his "mirror of thoughts". In order to form others, he first needed the help of others to look within himself, again question himself and thereby convert and correct himself again. For a great part, these "others" are his auctoritates. Although a theoretical work, Coornhert's ethic can be considered an example of rational virtue being put into practice. As stated earlier, Coornhert avoided the personal anecdote in order to reach a larger public.
So, in short: Coornhert expects and encourages his reader to pursue insight in his own condition. This insight he calls the "necessary knowledge of the self" (ZK II, V. 38), and it mainly consists of learning how to manage one's emotions 70 . In this ideal of emotional and moral self-guidance, which is based on secure knowledge and in Coornhert's terms can be described as the combination of moderation ("tem-lust" 71 ) and gentleness ("zachtmoedicheyd" 72 ), lies the goal of Coornhert's perfectibilist life-philosophy. It is at this point that the three motives I mentioned in the introduction, perfectibility -knowledge -and moderation, intersect.
Conclusion.
In Coornhert's moral program God, divine grace and the Bible play a very important role. As I have shown, ancient authorities are only used insofar as they are in accordance with the Scripture. But more interesting than scrutinizing the whole Zedekunst to find each and every author Coornhert has used, is to examine the way in which his specific use of these intellectual authorities fits in with the role of knowledge in the ethical ideal he wants to carry out. As we know, Coornhert's ideal of the virtuous life calls for a twofold moral conversion.
To further this conversion, Coornhert practically never mentions his authorities by name. This reaching that second stage of his conversion that leads to true virtue. As Coornhert states, the virtuous life is essentially an art, and just as any other art, one has to live and breathe it or else it would never be other than plain dead knowledge.
